With respect to the demands you propose at the end, you're confronted here four-square with the basic problem of deterrence theory: Is your threat credible?
Mutual Assured Destruction -- @Coach's forefathers flying race-tracks in the sky notwithstanding -- wasn't credible until there was a sub-surface leg to the strategic triad -- that is, until there were enough boomers afloat to ensure that Magnitogorsk and Petropavlovsk and all those other Soviet cities on the SIOP could have their rubble bounced once or twice. And counterforce wasn't credible until the MIRV and, especially, the Trident-series MIRVs.
So is YOUR threat credible? If she says "no" at any point along the decision tree, are you REALLY going to pull the Divorce Trigger? And have you signaled that willingness? Have you set your CRM-114 so that there's no going back? That was always the problem with the tactical nuke, wasn't it? By delegating authority for nuclear release to the operational level of command, the President essentially cut himself out of the escalation ladder.
So I think you need to be clear to yourself on this -- if W says "no" are you prepared to be the Agent of Destruction?
If not, don't bluff -- you'll never regain that lost ground.
